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U.S. v. CELESTIN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,
v.
JUDE CELESTIN, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 09-1161.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
July 14, 2010.
Sejal H. Patel, with whom Shannon Frison and Frison Law Firm, P.C., were on
brief for appellant.
Robert A. Parker, Criminal Division, Appellate Section, U.S. Department of
Justice, with whom Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Gary G. Grindler,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney,
James P. Dowden, Scott L. Garland, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on
brief for appellee.
Before Torruella, Lipez, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.
Jude Celestin was convicted by a jury for bank fraud and conspiracy to commit
bank fraud. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 371. He appeals that conviction on
multiple grounds. First, Celestin contends that the district court abused its
discretion in trying Celestin jointly with a codefendant. He asserts that the
introduction into evidence of his nontestifying codefendant's confession
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause and Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968), and that he suffered irreparable prejudice as a result of
his codefendant's incompetent pro se representation. Next, Celestin argues that
his due process rights were violated by the government's failure to turn over
exculpatory evidence prior to the trial. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963). Finally, Celestin claims that the district court improperly instructed
the jury regarding an essential element of bank fraud. We have carefully
considered these claims; finding no error, we affirm.
A. Facts[ 1 ]
Burdley Jean, a former employee of Fleet Bank (now Bank of America), devised a
scheme to steal money from customer bank accounts using counterfeit checks. Jean
targeted several banks in New England, including Fleet, Sovereign Bank, and
Citizens Bank. He recruited bank insiders to provide him with customer account
information (such as account numbers, balances, and customer names), which Jean
used to create counterfeit checks. Jean recruited other individuals to act as
"runners" who would cash or deposit these counterfeit checks. All told,
conspiracy members wrote bogus checks totaling in excess of $1 million.
Celestin, an account manager at Fleet's South Shore Plaza branch, was one of the
bank insiders recruited by Jean. On twenty-two days over a six-month period,
Celestin used his unique operator identification number ("OPID") to improperly
access fourteen customer accounts, many of which had no relationship to his
branch. Shortly after Celestin accessed each account, runners would begin
cashing counterfeit checks against the account.
Bank records introduced at trial showed that, on certain occasions, Celestin's
OPID access of these accounts was interspersed with access of his own checking
account. Celestin's time and attendance records also confirmed that he was
working at the bank on the days and at the times when his OPID was used to
access the defrauded accounts, with one exception: on October 6, 2004, the
records showed Celestin working from 4:45 p.m. to 10:15 p.m. (the bank's late
shift, which was his default schedule), but his OPID records showed him
accessing accounts from 10:51 a.m. to 12:58 p.m. (roughly, the early shift,
which he occasionally worked). Celestin's OPID records showed no activity
between 4:45 p.m. and 10:15 p.m. on that day. The bank's computer system listed
the evening shift as Celestin's default work time, and bank employees testified
that the records would only have reflected a different time if Celestin had
manually changed it.
In November 2004, FBI agents visited Celestin's office and questioned him about
his role in the scheme. They showed him the OPID records documenting that he had
accessed the defrauded accounts. Celestin admitted that he accessed the
accounts, but stated that he did so only after the accounts had been defrauded.
When the agents presented him with evidence that this was not true, Celestin
changed his story. He explained that, at least with respect to one particular
account, a representative had given him permission to access the account.
Celestin was unable to explain why he had accessed the other defrauded accounts.
B. Procedural History
Celestin was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, see 18
U.S.C. § 371, and five counts of bank fraud, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2.
Celestin initially pleaded guilty, but later filed a motion to withdraw his
plea, which the district court granted. After a nine-day trial, in which
Celestin was tried jointly with another coconspirator, Ducarmel Edouard, the
jury convicted Celestin of the conspiracy charge and two counts of bank fraud.
The jury acquitted him of the three remaining counts of bank fraud. The district
court sentenced Celestin to forty-one months of imprisonment, followed by three
years of supervised release. The district court also ordered him to pay a fine
of $2,500 and $587,602 in restitution. Celestin filed a timely appeal.
A. Severance
Celestin first argues that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion to sever his trial from that of his coconspirator Edouard, who
chose to represent himself. Celestin asserts that, as a result of this joint
trial, his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated and, in any
event, he suffered irreparable prejudice due to Edouard's strange behavior in
the course of his pro se representation.
We review a severance ruling "for any manifest abuse of discretion which
deprived appellant of a fair trial and resulted in a miscarriage of justice."
United States v. PeZa-Lora, 225 F.3d 17, 33 (1st Cir. 2000). "The hurdle is
intentionally high," particularly in conspiracy cases, where severance "is
especially disfavored." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). As the
Supreme Court has recognized, "[t]here is a preference in the federal system for
joint trials of defendants who are indicted together" because "they promote
efficiency and serve the interests of justice by avoiding . . . the inequity of
inconsistent verdicts." Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For that reason, severance is
warranted "only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a
specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a
reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." Id. at 539. Whether this hurdle has
been met is "committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." United
States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 325 (1st Cir. 1995).
1. Confrontation Clause Claim
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant
the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend.
VI. The primary purpose of confrontation is "to secure for the opponent the
opportunity of cross-examination." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678
(1986) (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). For that
reason, out-of-court statements which are "testimonial" in nature may be
admitted against criminal defendants only in certain limited circumstances. See
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) ("Where testimonial evidence is
at issue, . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination."). If these
statements are nontestimonial, however, the Confrontation Clause "has no
application." Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007).
Against this backdrop, Celestin asserts that he was entitled to have his trial
severed from that of his codefendant because the admission into evidence of
Edouard's out-of-court confession violated Celestin's rights under the
Confrontation Clause. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968)
(prohibiting the admission of "powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements
of a codefendant" in a joint trial). Bruton, however, applies only to a
statement that is, as to the particular defendant challenging its admission, "inculpatory
on its face." United States v. RodrÃguez-Durán, 507 F.3d 749, 769 (1st Cir.
2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A statement that "identifie[s]
both the declarant and his codefendant by name as the perpetrators of the crime"
falls within the Bruton prohibition, but "[s]tatements that are incriminating
only when linked to other evidence in the case" do not. United States v.
Vega-Molina, 407 F.3d 511, 520 (1st Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
Edouard did not testify, and was therefore unavailable for
cross-examination by Celestin's counsel. His confession was, as a result, read
to the jury. It stated in full:
I met Burdley Jean at the 3C Nightclub on Blue Hill Ave. BJ asked if I were
interested in cashing counterfeit checks, to which I agreed.
In 2003, I cashed four checks and remember cashing a counterfeit check in
Tewksbury. I remember visiting Burdley at his address on Ashmont Street in
Dorchester. Burdley accompanied me during the cashing of the counterfeit checks.
In 2004, I again agreed to cash counterfeit checks for Burdley. Burdley
proceeded to give me the checks and I went on to cash them on my own and after
each bank withdrawal, I would meet Burdley, relinquish the money, and receive up
to 20 percent of the funds.
I accept full responsibility for counterfeit checks in viewed surveillance
pictures of me.
The confession made no explicit reference to Celestin. It did not implicate
Celestin directly, nor did it suggest any connection between Celestin and the
conspiracy or even that others beyond Jean and Edouard were involved.
Celestin argues, nonetheless, that the confession was powerfully incriminating
insofar as its admission demonstrated the existence of a conspiracy to commit
bank fraud, effectively lowering the government's standard of proof. But
Edouard's confession is incriminatory as to Celestin, if at all, "only when
linked to other evidence" of Celestin's participation in the conspiracy and,
therefore, Bruton is not implicated. Vega-Molina, 407 F.3d at 520; see
RodrÃguez-Durán, 507 F.3d at 769 (finding no Bruton violation in a prosecution
for conspiracy where the statement at issue made no explicit reference to any of
the defendants who were on trial, other than the defendant who made the
statement, and defendants pointed only to prejudicial inferences the jury could
have drawn from the statement, including intent to participate).
Indeed, we have previously explained that the potential corroboration of the
government's case resulting from the admission of a codefendant's confession is
insufficient, without more, to rise to the level of a Bruton violation. United
States v. DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184, 1190 (1st Cir. 1979) ("The fact that a
codefendant's admission tended to corroborate the government's case against
[defendant] is simply not enough.") (citations omitted); accord United States v.
Greenleaf, 692 F.2d 182, 189 (1st Cir. 1982). Accordingly, the admission of
Edouard's confession into evidence does not present a Bruton issue.
Further, the district court instructed the jury that Edouard's out-of-court
statement was to be considered as evidence only against him and not against his
codefendant, Celestin. This limiting instruction was sufficient to cure any
prejudicial inference the jury might have drawn as to Celestin. See Richardson
v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 211 (1987) (holding "that the Confrontation Clause
is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession
with a proper limiting instruction" when the confession omits "any reference to
[the defendant's] existence").[ 2 ]
2. Pro Se Representation of Codefendant
Celestin also maintains that severance was necessary to avoid the substantial
prejudice he suffered due to codefendant Edouard's pro se representation. We
have previously held that "[a] codefendant's pro se representation is not,
without more, grounds for severance; a defendant must additionally show that
strong prejudice resulted from the representation." United States v. DeMasi, 40
F.3d 1306, 1313 (1st Cir. 1994). A showing of strong prejudice requires that the
defendant point to "specific prejudicial incidents that occurred before the
jury." Id. (emphasis added).
Here, there is no question that Edouard's behavior was, at times, bizarre. For
example, Celestin cites to the following exchange:
Edouard: Well, as I said before in previous pleadings, that
based on my First Amendment Right to freedom of religion, it's against my
religion to testify or give an oath.
Court: Well, you wouldn't have to take an oath and swear to God if it's against
your religion.
Edouard: It's against my religion to swear to anything
. . . .
Court: If you have a religious objection to the standard oath, [the Clerk] is
going to read you what the alternative will be. You'd be required to affirm.
Clerk: "Do you affirm and declare that the evidence that you
shall give to the Court and the jury shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth[?]"
Court: Would you be willing to say that before you testified?
Edouard: No, I will not.
Court: And is that because of your religious beliefs?
Edouard: Yes, it is. And also because I don't want to contract with this court
in any way.
Court: You don't want to contract.
Edouard: That would be a verbal agreement and I don't want to do that.
He also expressed his belief that the United States government did not exist.
And he maintained that he was not, in fact, Edouard, but a "holder in due
course." At one point, Edouard's stand-by counsel stated to the court, "there is
[a] real question in my mind as to whether the defendant has an appreciation of
how to present and assist himself in his own defense."
However, these statements, on which Celestin bases his challenge, were never
heard by the jury. Rather, the district judge instructed Edouard not to raise
these views to the jury, and Edouard abided by that instruction. Indeed, the
experienced district judge repeatedly complimented Edouard on his
"appropriate[]" and "professional" conduct before the jury, and expressly found
that "[h]e's not doing anything that would distract the jury from focusing on
the defense that [Celestin's counsel is] providing to Mr. Celestin." We
therefore find that Celestin has not shown that he suffered "strong prejudice"
based on these statements made outside of the jury's earshot. See DeMasi, 40
F.3d at 1313 & n.7 (concluding that allegedly inflammatory and prejudicial
statements of pro se defendant were not made before the jury and thus did not
amount to "strong prejudice").
Accordingly, on these facts, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Celestin's motion to sever.
B. Brady
Next, Celestin seeks reversal of his conviction on the ground that the
government withheld exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). Specifically, he asserts that the government failed to turn over
in a timely manner his time and attendance records for October 6, 2004, which
reflect a discrepancy between the hours listed as his work hours for that day
and the hours when his OPID accessed the defrauded accounts. He maintains that
these records proved he was not present in the bank at the times his OPID was
used to access the accounts, undermining the government's theory of the case. By
waiting until the trial was underway to provide the records, Celestin contends,
the government impeded his ability to mount a defense. The district court
rejected these arguments at trial, explaining that the government did not obtain
the records until after the trial had begun and that it had no obligation to
produce documents not in its possession. The court further noted that Celestin
was aware of these records and could have subpoenaed them himself in the
two-and-half years between his indictment and trial. Under Brady,
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution. But Brady did not create a general constitutional right to
discovery in a criminal case.
United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 64 (1st Cir. 2008)(internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). Rather, to make out a Brady violation, the
defendant must show that "(1) the evidence at issue is favorable to [the
defendant] because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the Government
suppressed the evidence; and (3) prejudice ensued from the suppression (i.e.,
the suppressed evidence was material to guilt or punishment)." Conley v. United
States, 415 F.3d 183, 188 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 281-82 (1999)). "Methods of enforcing disclosure requirements in criminal
trials are generally left to the discretion of the trial court, and we review
Brady determinations for abuse of discretion." DeCologero, 530 F.3d at 54-55
(internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).
In this case, there was no abuse of discretion. "The government's obligations
under Brady only extend to information in its possession, custody, or control,"
United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2006), and "Brady . . . [does
not] require[] a prosecutor to seek out and disclose exculpatory or impeaching
material not in the government's possession." Bender, 304 F.3d at 164. There is
no dispute that the government did not possess the records in question until the
trial was underway, at which point it promptly turned them over to Celestin. The
government explained that it did not obtain the records earlier because Celestin
had admitted that he accessed the accounts in question. Moreover, as the
district court noted, Celestin was well aware of his own time and attendance
records, and could have subpoenaed them himself in the two-and-a-half years
between his indictment and trial. Indeed, the government only obtained the
records after Celestin made a specific request for them. See, e.g., United
States v. Todd, 424 F.3d 525, 534 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding no Brady violation
where, in part, defendant was aware of potentially exculpatory records and
failed to subpoena them).
In any event, even assuming for argument's sake that Brady applied, Celestin has
failed to demonstrate that the alleged failure to disclose the records was
material, meaning that there is "a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." United States v. Brown, 510 F.3d 57, 71 (1st Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted). Celestin raised the October 6, 2004 discrepancy between the OPID
records and his time and attendance sheets repeatedly in his cross-examination
of government witnesses and in his closing argument. Although Celestin contends
that he was "handicapp[ed] . . . from fully using the exculpatory evidence" or
from "fully impeaching the government's main witness[,]" he fails to explain how
his trial strategy and defense would have been different if he had obtained the
records earlier.[ 3 ]
Moreover, the evidence that Celestin himself accessed the accounts was
substantial. The government introduced Celestin's November 2004 admission that
he had accessed the defrauded accounts. Time and attendance records for the
other twenty-one days established that Celestin was working at the bank at all
other times when his OPID was used to access the defrauded accounts. Records
also showed that, on October 6, 2004, Celestin did not log onto a computer at
all during the period in which his records indicated he was working. There was,
in addition, testimony from the bank's former manager which explained that the
bank's computers generated timesheets according to the employees' default hours,
and that the timesheets would have reflected a different time only if Celestin
had manually changed them. In light of all this, Celestin has fallen far short
of demonstrating that the government's failure to hand over the records prior to
trial could have affected the verdict.
For all these reasons, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's
rejection of Celestin's Brady claims.
C. Improper Jury Instruction
Finally, Celestin contends that the district court, in responding to a jury
question during deliberations, eliminated an essential element of one of the
charges, improperly amending the indictment.
In its instructions to the jury, the district court explained that the
indictment charged Celestin with two distinct crimes — one count of conspiracy
to commit bank fraud and five substantive counts of bank fraud — and that the
jury could convict him of bank fraud if it found that (1) he committed the fraud
himself, (2) he aided and abetted others in the commission of the fraud, or (3)
another coconspirator committed the crime in furtherance of a conspiracy in
which Celestin himself participated (the Pinkerton theory), see United States v.
Vázquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 62 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[U]nder the Pinkerton
doctrine, a defendant can be found liable for the substantive crime of a
coconspirator provided the crime was reasonably foreseeable and committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy."). These three alternative theories of liability
were taken directly from the indictment, and Celestin made no objection to this
aspect of the district court's instructions. Later, during its deliberations,
the jury inquired whether the use of the phrase "in furtherance of the
conspiracy" in the bank fraud counts meant that these counts were "dependent on
a guilty vote" on the conspiracy count. The court instructed the jury that if it
acquitted Celestin on the conspiracy count, the number of the alternative
theories of liability would be reduced to two: that Celestin committed or aided
and abetted the specific incidents of bank fraud alleged in the indictment.
Celestin contends that in so doing, the district court impermissibly eliminated
an essential element of the substantive bank fraud counts (i.e., that they were
performed in the course of the charged conspiracy), resulting in a constructive
amendment.
"A constructive amendment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are
altered, either literally or in effect, by prosecution or court after the grand
jury has last passed upon them." United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 58 n.4
(1st Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 3 F.3d 456, 462-63 (1st Cir.
1993)). "Constructive amendments are forbidden by the Fifth Amendment, which
guarantees defendants the right to be tried only on charges indicted by a grand
jury." United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 131 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted). "A constructive amendment is considered prejudicial per se and grounds
for reversal of a conviction." Id. (quotation omitted). We review a claim of
constructive amendment de novo. Id. (citation omitted).
At the outset, we note that Celestin's contention that his conviction should be
vacated because we cannot tell whether the jury convicted him of the two bank
fraud counts on a Pinkerton theory or under one of the two alternate theories of
liability is wide off the mark. The jury convicted Celestin of the conspiracy
charge and "the law is crystalline that, when the government has advanced
several alternate theories of guilt and the trial court has submitted the case
to the jury on that basis, an ensuing conviction may stand as long as the
evidence suffices to support any one of the submitted theories." United States
v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 2006). Celestin has not argued that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction under any of the theories
alleged in the indictment.
In any event, we find that the district court properly instructed the jury as to
all the ways in which Celestin could be convicted of the substantive bank fraud
charges, which were clearly set forth in the indictment. There is thus no doubt
that Celestin had notice of the various theories of liability on which he could
be convicted. See United States v. Hernández, 490 F.3d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 2007)
(finding no constructive amendment where defendant had notice of the charges
against him through the indictment). It also follows that in answering the
jury's question the district court did not broaden the bases on which Celestin
could be convicted. Compare Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960)
(holding that an indictment was unconstitutionally broadened where prosecution
offered evidence of two theories of liability — interference with interstate
sand shipments and interference with interstate steel shipments — but grand
jury indicted defendant only on the first theory), with United States v. Miller,
471 U.S. 130, 145 (1985) (finding that, even though the indictment alleged that
defendant defrauded his insurer by consenting to the burglary in advance and by
lying to his insurer about the value of his loss, the government's trial proof
concerning only the latter permissibly narrowed the indictment's charges).
Rather, when the court explained to the jury that Celestin could not be
convicted under a conspiracy theory if it acquitted him on the conspiracy
charge, the court narrowed the permissible bases for conviction in that
scenario; that is, the court eliminated a theory of liability rather than
removed an element of the crime.[ 4 ] It is well-established that a court may
"narrow[] the indictment's charges without adding any new offenses," Miller, 471
U.S. at 138, and that "where an indictment charges several offenses, or the
commission of one offense in several ways, the withdrawal from the jury's
consideration of one offense or one alleged method of committing it does not
constitute a forbidden amendment of the indictment." Id. at 146 (citations
omitted).
Celestin has failed to show any violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment.
Affirmed. 1.
This copy provided by Leagle,Inc.
|
________________________________________________ |
| |
| PRESS
RELEASE |
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2008
WWW.USDOJ.GOV/USAO/MA
CONTACT: CHRISTINA DiIORIO-STERLING
PHONE: (617)748-3356
E-MAIL: USAMA.MEDIA@USDOJ.GOV
BANK INSIDER AND RUNNER CONVICTED FOR ROLES IN COUNTERFEIT CHECK RING
BOSTON, MA - Two men were convicted yesterday in federal court on charges of
conspiracy and bank fraud arising from their roles in a large-scale counterfeit
check ring.
United States Attorney Michael J. Sullivan and Warren T. Bamford, Special Agent
in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Field Division,
announced today that JUDE CELESTIN, age 25, of Boston, and DUCARMEL EDOUARD, age
30, of Brockton, were convicted by a jury sitting before Chief U.S. District
Judge Mark L. Wolf of conspiracy and bank fraud.
Evidence presented during the ten-day trial proved that CELESTIN and EDOUARD
were members of a counterfeit check cashing ring that operated in the Boston
area in 2003 and 2004, whose members attempted to cash close to $1 million in
counterfeit checks. CELESTIN was an employee of Fleet Bank/Bank of America who
provided the ring with customer account information in order to create the
counterfeit checks. EDOUARD was one of several check runners who cashed the
counterfeit checks that were created by other members of the ring. The evidence
presented at trial included photos of EDOUARD cashing numerous counterfeit
checks throughout Massachusetts and bank computer records showing CELESTIN
searching for, identifying, and then accessing various small business accounts
that were subsequently defrauded by the cashing of counterfeit checks.
Chief Judge Mark Wolf scheduled CELESTIN’S and EDOUARD’S sentencings for
September 9, 2008. CELESTIN and EDOUARD each face up to five years’ imprisonment
on the conspiracy charges and thirty years’ imprisonment on the bank fraud
charges. The conspiracy charges also carry a maximum term of three years of
supervised release, and a $250,000 fine. Each bank fraud charge further carries
a maximum term of five years’ supervised release and a $1,000,000 fine.
Others charged in connection with this counterfeit check ring include: BURDLEY
JEAN who pleaded guilty on December 27, 2007, and was sentenced by Chief Judge
Mark Wolf to fifty- seven months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of
supervised release; PETERSON DUMORNAY, who pleaded guilty on January 9, 2008 and
is currently serving a forty-one month sentence to be followed by three years of
supervised release; JEAN MARC NORISCAT, who pleaded guilty on November 15, 2006
and is currently awaiting sentencing; ANDERSON DEMOSTHENES, who pleaded guilty
on January 9, 2008 and is currently awaiting sentencing; JAMES ROBERT NORMIL,
who pleaded guilty on June 23, 2006 and is currently awaiting sentencing; STEVEN
MARCELIN, who pleaded guilty on April 7, 2008 and is currently awaiting
sentencing; SHAVONE NOBLE, who pleaded guilty on June 23, 2006 and is currently
awaiting sentencing; and TYAMISHA TAVARES, who pleaded guilty on June 23, 2006
and is currently awaiting sentencing.
The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It was
prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys James P. Dowden, Scott L. Garland and
John A. Capin, of Sullivan’s Economic Crimes and Computer Crimes Unit.
###
EDITOR's NOTE: First posted Tuesday, August 10, 2010, but updated Wednesday,
August 11, 2010
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